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On 26 December 2004, an earthquake in the West Coast of Northern 
Sumatra set off a series of other earthquakes lasting for several hours 
which resulted in a Tsunami in the Indian Ocean. This led to widespread 
disaster, particularly in Sri Lanka, India, the Maldives, Indonesia and 
Thailand, with damage also in Malaysia, Bangladesh, Somalia, the 
Seychelles and Kenya. Sri Lanka, the ‘pearl of the Indian Ocean’, blessed 
with abundant natural resources, faced one of the worst natural disasters 
recorded in recent history. The Tsunami struck a relatively thin but long 
coastal area stretching over 1,000 kilometers - two thirds of the country's 
coastline.  The destructive ocean waves killed more than 35,000 people, 
displaced nearly 2,500,000 people and destroyed thousands of 
houses. The overall damage to Sri Lanka is estimated at $1 billion, with a 
large proportion of losses concentrated in housing, tourism, fisheries and 
transportation. Development Partners range from private individuals both 
inside and outside Sri Lanka, to governments and NGOs. Coastal 
infrastructure, namely roads, railways, power, telecommunications, water 
supply and fishing ports were also significantly affected. Reactions ranged 
from immediate assistance to communities and local governments in 
restarting to function as speedily as possible, to short and long-term 
assistance in supporting communities to rebuild their infrastructure and 
housing so that they might again have normal lives and eventually recover 
from the trauma of the tsunami.  
  
As the infrastructure consists primarily of transportation, electric and 
telecommunications, and water and sewerage facilities that provide 
services to the public through a network of roads, rails, ports, airports, pipes 
and lines, the effectiveness of infrastructure systems impact on all 
economic activities. In this context, this paper aims to analyse the impact of 
the Tsunami on infrastructure facilities in Sri Lanka and how the post-
Tsunami reconstruction process has affected the development of the same. 
A comprehensive literature review was carried out regarding the Tsunami 
and its impact on the nation. The infrastructure-related reconstruction and 
rehabilitation data were obtained from the RADA (Reconstruction And 
Development Agency, formerly TAFREN) through unstructured interviews 
conducted among personnel involved in the reconstruction and 
rehabilitation of infrastructure facilities. Results confirm that after almost 
one and a half years, the Tsunami rehabilitation process is slow as 
compared to its start.  
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INDIAN OCEAN TSUNAMI – 2004 
 
OVERVIEW 
Sri Lanka, the ‘pearl of the Indian Ocean’, blessed with abundant natural resources, 
faced one of the worst natural disasters recorded in recent history. An under-sea 
quake, measured at 8.9 on the Richter Scale by the Hawaii Seismic Centre, occurred 
near Sumatra in the early hours of 26 December 2004 and set off a series of waves 
which devastated parts of India, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, 
the Maldives, Somalia, the Seychelles, Kenya in the East African Coast. Sri Lanka was 
one of the countries which suffered the heaviest losses. 
 
The percentage of the coastal population affected ranges from about 20% in the 
southern districts of Galle, Matara and Hambantota, to 80% in the north and east 
districts of Ampara, Batticaloa, Mullativu and Trincomalee. The overall damage is 
estimated at $1 billion, with major losses concentrated in the housing, tourism, fisheries 
and transport sectors (ADB, 2006). Total losses across all sectors are estimated to be 
about 5% of the GDP of Sri Lanka (ADB, 2006). The largest share of output losses 
appear to be in the fisheries and tourism sectors due to lost income and production. 
Many people working in the informal sector who serviced the fisheries, tourism sectors 
and the coastal communities have lost their homes and livelihoods, causing greater 
vulnerability to poverty. 
  
OVERALL DAMAGES 
The Tsunami has led to an unprecedented loss of life, also causing severe damage to 
private and commercial property as well as the productive assets and livelihoods of 
people in 13 districts. These losses include: 
 
• 35,322 people were killed, more than 516,150 people were displaced and over 
two thirds of the island’s coastline and outlying 13 districts were affected. Over 
6000 are reported missing (United Nations, 2005). 
• An estimated 98,000 houses were damaged or destroyed, leaving 
approximately 940,000 people with no homes to return to (United Nations, 
2005). 
• 65% of the room capacity in the hotel sector has been affected, with all the sea-
side resorts damaged.  
• The road and rail transport from Colombo to Hambantota in the south and some 
parts of the Puttalam district were badly damaged. Railway lines required major 
repairs. Approximately 800km of national roads, together with about 1500km of 
provincial and local government roads were damaged by the force of the 
Tsunami, along with 25 bridges and causeways located in the north, east and 
south of the country. 
• The Tsunami had a devastating effect on the coastal fisheries industry, leaving 
16,919 fishing boats lost or destroyed and a further 7,266 damaged. An 
estimated 1 million fishing nets were also lost. Many of the landing sites around 
the coast were also seriously damaged. 90% of the fishing crafts were reported 
to have been damaged, with 100% of the modern sea-going fleet completely 
destroyed. 
• 10 out of the 12 fisheries harbors were damaged, while 8 were completely  
destroyed. 
 
 
 
 
  
IMPACT OF THE TSUNAMI ON INFRASTRUCTURE FACILITIES 
The Tsunami further damaged coastal infrastructure that was already in a seriously 
debilitated condition due to the recent conflict, maintenance neglect, lack of 
development investment and the effects of high rainfall and flooding in recent years. 
Specific impacts on the coastal infrastructure included: 
 
• Roads: erosion damage occurred on sections of the coastal highway 
network and a number of bridges were damaged or completely washed 
away. A total length of approximately 800km of National Road was 
damaged, together with about 1500km of provincial and local 
government roads. 
• Railways: sections of track-work, bridges, signalling and 
communications systems, buildings and some rolling stock were 
severely damaged on the 160km of coastline between Colombo and 
Matara.  
• Electricity: the electricity distribution system and service connections 
suffered damage throughout the Tsunami-affected areas. 
• Water Supply and Sanitation: potable water treatment and reticulation 
systems suffered damage, and local supply systems - mainly ground 
water sourced - suffered damage and salt water intrusion. 
• Ports: facilities and vessels were damaged at the ports of Galle, 
Trincomalee, Kankasanthurai and Point Pedro, and the perimeter wall. 
Some equipment was also damaged at the Oluwil Port Training Centre. 
 
 
DISASTER MANAGEMENT 
A precise definition of environmental disaster is difficult. Natural disasters are those 
elements of the physical environment harmful to Man and caused by forces extraneous 
to him. Natural disasters have also been seen as ‘acts of god’. We tend to over-
emphasise the surprise factor of a disaster when, in reality, it is now possible to 
delineate many hazard–prone areas and to recognise that common disasters, such as 
floods, are recurrent events at certain locations. It is clear that risk assessment and risk 
perception have to be combined in the attempts made by governments and others to 
reduce environmental disasters. Effective disaster management requires accurate and 
timely information, which is utilised for a number of vital tasks.  
 
Disaster management activities can be grouped into five phases that are related by 
time and function to all types of emergencies and disasters. These phases are also 
related to each other, and each involves different types of skills. 
 
• Planning: activities necessary to analyse and document the possibility of an 
emergency or disaster and the potential consequences or impacts on life, 
property and the environment. This includes assessing the hazards, risks, 
mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery needs.  
 
• Mitigation: activities that actually eliminate or reduce the probability of a 
disaster; for example, an arms build-up to deter enemy attack, or legislation that 
requires stringent building codes in earthquake prone areas. It also includes 
long-term activities designed to reduce the effects of unavoidable disasters; for 
example, land use management, establishing comprehensive emergency 
management programs and so forth. 
  
• Preparedness: activities necessary to the extent that mitigation measures have 
not, nor cannot prevent disasters. In the preparedness phase, governments, 
organisations and individuals develop plans to save lives and minimise disaster 
damage; for example, compiling state resource inventories, mounting training 
exercises, installing early warning systems and preparing predetermined 
emergency response forces. Preparedness measures also seek to enhance 
disaster response operations.  
 
• Response: activities following an emergency or disaster. These activities are 
designed to provide emergency assistance for victims. They also seek to 
stabilize the situation, reduce the probability of secondary damage and speed 
up recovery operations. 
 
• Recovery: activities necessary to return all systems to normal or better. They 
include two sets of activities: 
? Short-term recovery activities return vital life support systems to 
minimum operating standards.  
? Long-term recovery activities may continue for a number of years after a 
disaster. Their purpose is to return life to normal or improved levels; for 
example, redevelopment loans, legal assistance, community planning 
and the reconstruction of infrastructure facilities. 
 
 
DISASTER MANAGEMENT IN TSUNAMI RECONSTRUCTION 
Immediately after the Tsunami, positive collective actions were taken on a scale never 
known before. Individuals, small groups, the government, religious institutions, private 
sector organisations, the media and non-governmental organisations all rushed to 
reach distraught and desperate fellow citizens. Recognising the seriousness, urgency 
and magnitude, the government created an institutional mechanism to efficiently co-
ordinate assistance. This mechanism built upon donor delivery of assistance and 
agreed upon guiding principles for the recovery process; these included transparency 
and accountability, subsidiary, co-ordination and consultation. In the aftermath of 
tsunami, the President set up three task forces: 
  
1. Task Force for Rescue and Relief (TAFRER) 
2. Task Force for Law and Order and Logistics (TAFLOL) 
3. Task Force to Rebuild the Nation (TAFREN) 
 
At the national level, the Center for National Operations (CNO) was established under 
the President to co-ordinate relief operations and to gather and disseminate 
information. Within two months, the provision of immediate relief was streamlined and 
the relevant government officers at the national, provincial, local and village levels 
began to play key roles. The CNO was disbanded in February 2005 when TAFRER 
and TAFLOL were merged to form TAFOR (Task Force for Relief), with a mandate for 
looking after the well-being of affected groups. 
 
TAFREN was created as the primary institutional mechanism in recovery and 
reconstruction. TAFREN’s role was to co-ordinate, facilitate and assist implementing 
organisations in co-ordinating donor assistance and fund-raising activities, expediting 
the procurement process, and enabling implementing agencies through capacity 
building. Today the TAFREN function as RADA. In September 2005 TAFREN 
reorganised itself, focusing on four thematic areas: 
 
  
• Getting people back into homes. 
• Restoring livelihoods. 
• Health education and protection for all. 
• Upgrade national infrastructure. 
 
 
ANALYSIS OF TSUNAMI RECONSTRUCTION AND 
REHABILITATION OF INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS 
Naturally, re-housing the people was first on the government’s list of priorities, pushing 
the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the economic infrastructure to second place and 
thereby affecting the growth potential of the country further. Therefore after attending to 
emergency repairs, the government has entered into the phase of rehabilitation and 
reconstruction of national infrastructure in the affected areas, with the support of many 
development partners. However, although almost all the required funding has been 
received, in some cases contracts have been awarded and rehabilitation work is in 
progress, whereas in others contracts have not been finalized. 
 
The reconstruction phase is likely to take off from the rehabilitation process and may 
not be the outcome of a set of well-designed and considered plans. If the 
reconstruction process goes along these lines, Sri Lanka may loose an opportunity to 
re-build the devastated portions of the country. However, all indications are that badly 
laid out settlements with sub-standard housing and inadequate infrastructure will spring 
up once again – this time with government funding rather than foreign aids. Even 
though immediate rehabilitation has been very successful, the collected information 
suggests the progress of long-term rehabilitation of infrastructure facilities is slow. 
 
ROADS AND BRIDGES 
The affected roads were repaired and made motorable within two weeks of the 
Tsunami, while sufficient repairs to bridges / the installation of temporary Baily bridges 
was implemented to enable the movement of traffic. Long-term development plans for 
roads and bridges were also introduced and initiated perfectly. The current statuses of 
the post-Tsunami reconstruction of roads and bridges are shown in Tables 1 and 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 1: Rehabilitation and reconstruction status of road network as at 30 April 
2006. 
 
(Source: Reconstruction and Development Agency) 
1
Rehabilitation of Colombo – Galle – 
Hambantota – Wellawaya Road (A2) 
from Katukurunda (Kalutara) to 
Matara 
A KA/GA/MA 115.09 2400 WB
Quarries & Crushers are in operation in all 
3 contracts. Binder course 30 L.Km in Pck 
I, 3.2 L.km in Pck II and 2.3 L m in Pck III 
completed.  Clearing drains, culverts are in 
progress. 
Sep-05 Mar-07
3
Rehabilitation of Colombo – Galle – 
Hambantota – Wellawaya Road (A2) 
from  Matara to Weerawila 
MA/HA/MO 98.00 2450
4 Panegamuwa Debarawewa HA 4.10 74
5 Tissa – Kirinda (B422) HA 13.00 260
7
Section necessary for emegency 
repairs in Tsunami affected Region-
STAART
GA/MA/HA/AM/
BA/TR/   MU/JA _ 1700 JAPAN
Works are in progress on 23 items N.H & 
31 items Access  roads. Estimates are  
prepared for other items. Total expenditure 
as at 31-12-2006 is 78millions.
Jan-05 Dec-06
8 Potuvil to Akkaraipattu C 45.20 1172 EC 
CATB approved PQ list for ICB sent for 
ADB concurrence and response is awaited. 
Bid documents submitted for ADB 
concurrence. RFP documents for 
consultancy have been issued to 11 
preselected firms. The original submission 
date 27-04-2006 needs extension due to 
subsequent change of scope of civil works.
Jun-06 Sep-08
9
Akkaraipattu to Batticaloa (A004) to 
Thirukkondiyamadu (A15) (junction 
with A11)
B AM/BA 98.00 3130 JAPAN
Loan Agreement was signed in March 
2006. TEC approved PQ documents,  Bid 
documents and RFP documents were 
submitted to CATB. Contract Awards are 
expected by December 2006
Dec-06 Dec-08
10
Construction of roads from 
Thrikkondiyadumadu to Verugal to 
Mutur to Trincomalee
C BA/TR 74.03 1900
11
Rehabilitation of Allai Kantale Road 
(B10) including Causeways 6m with 
shoulder.
C TR 41.00 1050
12
Construction of roads from 
Trincomalee to Pulmoddai 
C TR 55.00 825
14
Mullaitivu-Mankulam Road  (AA034) MU 49.25 890
15
Mullaitivu-Puliyankulam Road (B296) MU 41.83 750
16
Paranthan- Karachchi-Mullaitivu 
Road (AA035) MU/KI 52.13 940
17
Point-Pedro - Kodikamam (B68) JA 17.00 310
Main Scope of Work
 A Repair & pave with Asphaltic Concrete (AC), including small structures
B Rehabilitate and improve to 2-lane, repave with Asphaltic Concrete (AC), including small structures
C Rehabilitate and improve to 2-lane, repave with Double Bituminous Surface Treatment (DBST), including small structure
Tentative cost  
(Rs. Mn)
C 
CATB approved PQ list for ICB sent for 
ADB concurrence and response is awaited. 
Bid documents submitted for ADB 
concurrence. RFP documents for 
consultancy have been issued to 11 
preselected firms. The original submission 
date 27-04-2006 needs extension due to 
subsequent change of scope of civil works.
AFD
Consultants have mobilized. PQ documents 
for Civil Works are being reviewed by the 
consultants  Contract Award is expected by 
February  2007
EC 
CATB approved PQ list for ICB sent for 
ADB concurrence and response is awaited. 
Bid documents submitted for ADB 
concurrence. Tender documents for LCB 
Southern sector is under review by TEC. 
RFP documents for consultancy have been 
issued to 11 preselected firms. The original 
submission date 27-04-2006 needs 
extension due to subsequent change of 
scope of civil works.
2230
Rehabilitation of Wellawaya to 
Monaragala to Siyambalanduwa to 
Karaitivu. 
148.002
B
C MO/AM
Donor Present Status
WB
Pck 9 tender s were closd on 08-03-2006 
and evaluation is in progress. Pck 10 
tenders will be closed on 09-05-2006.
ADB     
Name of Road  with Route No. Rehab. Work Type
Length of 
Road (km) S/NO District
Jun-06
COMPLETION 
DATE
Sep-08
Sep-08
Sep-08
Sep-08
Jun-06
Jun-06
START 
DATE
Feb-07
  
Table 2: Rehabilitation and reconstruction status of bridges as at 30 April 2006. 
 
(Source: Reconstruction and Development Agency) 
 
AM - Ampara            BA  - Batticaloa       GA  - Galle              HA  - Hambantota     
JA   - Jaffna              KA  - Kalutara          KI   - Kilinochchi     MA - Matara     
MO - Monaragala      MU - Mullativu         TR - Trincomalee 
 
 
FISHERIES 
The fisheries industry was one of the sectors hit hardest by the Tsunami. In addition to 
the loss of lives and homes, fishermen also had the additional burden of watching their 
livelihoods disappear as the gigantic waves tossed their fishing equipment onto 
rooftops and trees. However, with assistance from the government and local and 
international donors, the industry is taking tentative steps to return to pre-Tsunami 
conditions.  New nets have also been issued to the fishermen by the government and 
NGOs to enable them to recommence fishing (RADA, 2006).  
 
ELECTRICITY 
The government has planned a three stage approach to rebuilding the power supply. 
The first phase - costing US$ 25 million - will focus on the installation of electrical 
distribution systems along the coastal belt. Work on this phase has already begun. At 
present, 47 substations are once more in operation. Approximately 170km of voltage 
lines have also been repaired, enabling the restoration of power to 8,580 families. The 
second stage - costing a further US$ 42 million - envisages further rehabilitation of the 
damaged electrical distribution system. Donor nations have already pledged funds for 
this phase. A third stage – costing US$ 48 million – will provide for the provision of 
additional transmission and generation of power along the coastal areas (RADA, 2006). 
Project Name District Main Item of Work Proposed
Estimated Cost   
( Rs. Mn )
Funding 
Arrangements Present Status Start Date Completion Dtae
5 major bridges on A2 Kalutara to Matara at Akurala, 
Seenigama, Magalla, Goyyapana & Weligama. GA/ MA Reconstruction 650 JAPAN
Bye Passes constructed. Foundations under 
construction.Overall progress is 54.5% Aug-05 Dec-06
Arugam Bay Bridge (Including approach roads) AM Reconstruction 600 USAID
Consultancy Contract was awarded. Designs will be 
completed by consultants by Mid May 2006. Civil work 
Contract Award is expected by August 2006.
Sep-06 Dec-08
Komari bridge and causeway
Periakallar Causeway
Koddaikallar Causeway
Panichankerni bridge 
Kallady Bridge BA Reconstruction 970 JAPAN Dec-06 Dec-08
Oddaimavadi Bridge BA Reconstruction 1100 SPAIN
Funds pledged. Loan Agreement is yet to be signed. 
Project Committee has submitted the report on Project 
Plan. Contract Awards are expected by September 2006.
Sep-06 Dec-08
Verugal Bridge 270
Kayankerny bridge 150
Mutur bridge 300
Gangei Bridge including access 300
Upparu Bridge including access 400
Irakkandi Bridge (new 2 lane bridge to replace 1 lane bridge) 
Koduwakattumalai Bridge (currently a ferry)
Yan Oya Bridge (currently a ferry)
Bridge to replace Kinya Ferry (existing project) TR New Construction 1260 SAUDI Contract awarded in November 2005. Contractor has mobilised and commenced works. Nov-05 Feb-08
Mahanama Bridge at Matara Town MA Reconstruction 700 KOICA Designs were completed and work will start by May 2006. Consultants have mobilized May-06 May-09
SPAIN
Dec-06
Dec-08
Sep-05
Sep-06
JAPAN
AFD
Sep-06
Funds pledged. Loan Agreement is yet to be signed. 
Project Committee has submitted the report on Project 
Plan. Contract Awards are expected by September 2006.
Dec-08
Detailed designs completed for Periakallar  and 
Koddaikallar causeways. De-tour constructed and 
opened for traffic. Coffer dams are under construction. 
Designs still continue on Komari and Panichanerni 
bridges. Progress is very slow.
Loan Agreement was signed in March 2006. Designs 
are being carried out. Contract Award is expected by 
December 2006.
TR 1190New Construction
New Construction
AM
Consultancy awarded and designs wil be carrid out by 
the consultants. Contract Award is expected by 
September  2006.
New Construction 800
Reconstruction
TR
  
WATER SUPPLY 
All the water supply systems in coastal area which were affected by the Tsunami were 
fully or partly damaged. The current progress of rehabilitation work regarding the water 
supply is shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: District summary resettlement site water supply status progress. 
 
 
 
(Source: Reconstruction and Development Agency) 
 
 
SANITATION 
Sanitation was also badly affected by the Tsunami. The immediate rehabilitation needs 
were fulfilled perfectly, but the long-term sanitary projects are still in progress. 
 
CAUSES FOR DELAYS IN RECONSTRUCTION OF 
INFRASTRUCTURE    FACILITIES 
This section briefly identifies the causes for delays in post tsunami re- construction of 
infrastructure facilities in Sri Lanka.  
 
Equity  
In Sri Lanka, equity issues have attracted a lot of attention. The government has made 
an effort to ensure equal access to support for all Tsunami-affected people. Whereas 
entitlements and allocation are the same, the pace of progress is still slower in the 
north-east, given capacity gaps, lower levels of economic activity and security 
constraints and concerns in the un-cleared LTTE areas. (Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam is a politico-military separatist organisation that has been waging an at times 
violent campaign for a separate state comprising the Tamil-majority North and East 
regions of Sri Lanka). Particular attention has also been paid to equity regarding 
Design 
Stage
Construction 
Stage Design Stage
Construction 
Stage
Kalutara 90 85 5958 39 43% 41 35 4 39% 4%
Galle 66 39 4401 32 48% 39 3 36 5% 55%
Matara 59 37 4319 15 25% 59 48 8 81% 14%
Hambantota 26 20 5269 19 73% 22 6 20 23% 77%
Ampara 34 13 5941 19 56% 32 10 0 29% 0%
Batticaloa 34 6 3915 34 100% 28 15 0 44% 0%
Trincomallee 84 24 5964 36 43% 84 84 0 100% 0%
Mullativu 36 3 5895 36 100% 36 36 0 100% 0%
Killinochi 2 1 500 2 100% 2 0 0 0% 0%
Jaffna 51 23 4810 51 100% 51 29 0 57% 0%
Gampaha 10 2 833 3 30% 3 3 0 30% 0%
Colombo 18 6 1842 0 0% 7 5 0 28% 0%
No of Housing Schemes 
Water Supply System  
Implementation is in 
Progress
% of Housing Schemes, Water 
Supply System  Implementation 
is in Progress
Permanenant Water Supply SolutionIntermediate Water Supply SolutionHousing Schemes / Units
District
No of Housing 
Schemes with 
Donor 
Commitment
No of Housing 
Schemes Under 
Implementation 
Total No 
of Units
No of 
Housing 
Schemes 
with Water 
Supply
% of 
Housing 
Schemes 
Covered 
with Water 
Supply
No of 
Housing 
Schemes 
with Water 
Supply 
Method 
Identified
  
conflict-affected areas. For example, nearly 5,000 houses have been constructed in 
2005, and another 15,000 are planned to be constructed in 2006 with similar standards 
to Tsunami-affected houses. However, more efforts and resources will be necessary to 
address the needs of conflict-affected people and international resources for this issue 
remain limited. 
 
Communication barriers 
Communication between the stakeholders in rehabilitation is also a main factor 
affecting the reconstruction program. In particular, the lack of communication between 
LTTE and the Sri Lankan Government has had an immense impact on the people in 
the north east. Even though the housing in the north east area is almost completely 
reconstructed, the other infrastructure facilities are still in the procurement stages. 
 
Difficulties in establishing legal ownership of affected properties due to lack of 
documentation 
The legal ownership of damaged properties still poses a big problem to the 
reconstruction of the affected areas, as almost all the documentation was destroyed by 
the tidal waves. 
 
The poor capacity of existing organisations in: 
• Disaster preparedness.  
• Handling present tasks. 
• Capacity building with existing human resources. 
• Incorporating the best practices in environmental sustainability. 
• Disaster management. 
 
 
Lack of land 
Soon after the Tsunami, the government declared a 100/200 metre strip of land as a 
'no build zone' along the coastal belt of Sri Lanka. Consequently, the reconstruction 
and redevelopment phases of the Tsunami devastated areas were lagging behind for 
want of land beyond the so-called buffer zone, especially in Colombo, Kalutara and 
Gampaha districts. But later, due to appeals from the public and various other parties, 
the government decided to revise the 100/200 metre buffer zone with immediate effect 
to a range of between 55-25 metres in the Southern Districts and 100-50 metres in the 
North East, in order to accommodate special projects and those involved in fisheries 
related activities.  
 
Donors stepping back from investing 
Some of the donors agreed to invest in Sri Lanka if the peace remains. However, in 
accordance with the current situation, some of the donors have stepped back from their 
position and this has resulted in several of the government reconstruction projects 
being abandoned.  
 
Victims of the Tsunami 
The major obstacle to a speedy and efficient reconstruction process is the fact that the 
Tsunami killed many members of the public service and the armed services, whilst also 
destroying the physical infrastructure which housed the service-delivery points of the 
Government of Sri Lanka. 
 
 
Standard of the construction industry 
The national construction industry does not have the required number of contractors, 
equipment, skilled workforce, modern management practices or access to finance 
  
needed to maintain the required speed of the post-Tsunami reconstruction work. In 
addition, the cost of construction material is increasing. 
 
Procurement delay 
The government’s procurement methods are very lengthy and tedious, which makes 
the reconstruction process very slow. 
 
CONCLUSION 
A natural disaster will almost certainly strike again in the near future; the problem is 
that nobody knows exactly when. Logically, it can be expected that – at least in 
principle – precautions and remedies will be planned and systemic decisions be made 
concerning what to do ‘next time’. However in reality, up-front planning is often totally 
absent or, at best, insufficient, and post-disaster decisions are improvised in a rush and 
in difficult circumstances. 
 
After the Tsunami hit Sri Lanka, the Sri Lankan government, recognising the 
seriousness, urgency and magnitude of the problem coupled with the lack of 
experience, created an institutional mechanism to efficiently co-ordinate assistance. 
However, the government’s rehabilitation projects are running slowly due to several 
causes. Currently the disaster management team faces two main challenges in 
reconstructing the affected area. The first is the unfamiliarity of the event; since there 
was no awareness of proper disaster management systems, there were lots of errors in 
past rehabilitation programs. Solving past errors is the main challenge to the disaster 
management team. The second is the current status of the peace process. A 
breakdown of the ceasefire agreement between the Government of Sri Lanka and the 
LTTE has slowed down the reconstruction process and may threaten the security of aid 
workers. These are the main reasons for the delays in the reconstruction of 
infrastructure facilities, and now, after almost one and a half years, the post-Tsunami 
rehabilitation process is very slow as compared to its start.  
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